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A B S T R A C T
Previous research on public-good games revealed greater contributions by fast decision-makers than by slow
decision-makers. Interpreting greater contributions as generosity, this has been seen as evidence of generosity
being intuitive. We caution that fast decisions are more prone to error, and that mistakes, rather than pre-
ferences, may drive the observed comparative static. Varying the location of the equilibrium in public-good
games with a unique dominant strategy, we show that the location of the equilibrium determines whether
contributions are larger for fast decision-makers than for slow decision-makers. Replicating previous results, we
find that fast decision-makers give more than slow decision-makers when the equilibrium is below the mid-point
of the strategy set, but that this result is reversed when the equilibrium is above the mid-point. Consistent with
fast decisions being more prone to error, we find that individuals who make (or have to make) fast decisions are
insensitive to incentives, more often make mistakes, and are less likely to make equilibrium contributions. These
findings make clear that we must control for the rate of errors if we are to draw inference on preferences from
response time.
1. Introduction
To better understand the choices people make, researchers have
begun to investigate the decision process that leads to choices. Brain
imaging, eye tracking, and measures of heart rate and skin conductance
have all been used to understand this process.1 While these physiolo-
gical measures require special equipment, response time, which is the
time it takes individuals to make decisions, is easily acquired and is
increasingly used to examine decision-making.2 For example, response
time has been used to predict choices between products, to predict
indifference points, to more broadly draw inference on preferences, and
to understand strategic thinking and behavior (see Spiliopoulos and
Ortmann, 2017 for a review).3
Our ability to directly infer preferences from response time, how-
ever, hinges on the assumption that observed decisions reflect the un-
derlying preferences, and that the reflection is independent of the time
it takes individuals to make a decision. Questioning the validity of this
assumption, we find that fast decisions are more prone to error. This
holds when response time is endogenously chosen by the decision-
maker, and when it is exogenously imposed by the experimenter
through time pressure or time delay. Thus, inference on preferences
from response time requires that we account for the rate of mistakes.
To demonstrate the potential for false inference from response time
we examine the literature on whether individuals are tempted to be
generous or to be selfish. This literature extends models on dual selves
and dual-processes reasoning to voluntary giving and asks: Is giving
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impulsive and intuitive or, is it a deliberate and calculated choice?4
Arguing that intuitive decisions can be inferred from fast decisions and
that calculated decisions can be inferred from decisions that are made
more slowly, this literature explores how contributions to a public good
vary with response time. Lending support to generosity being intuitive,
these studies demonstrate in constant-return public-good games (aka
voluntary contribution mechanism, VCM) that fast decisions involve
greater contributions. This comparative static holds both when response
time is endogenously chosen by participants and when it is exogenously
imposed by the experimenter through time pressure or time delay.5
The concern in using response time to draw inference on preferences
is that fast decisions may be more prone to error.6 This concern is
particularly relevant in the VCM, where mistakes cannot be dis-
tinguished from generosity (Andreoni, 1995; Houser and Kurzban,
2002), and where fast mistakes can be misinterpreted as fast generosity.
In the classic VCM n individuals form a group and each allocates an
endowment between a private and a public good. A unit allocation to
the private good generates a private payoff of 1, while a unit con-
tribution to the public good secures a payoff of r to each group member,
where 1/n< r<1. To maximize own material payoffs, it is a dominant
strategy to allocate the endowment to the private good, whereas max-
imization of the group's aggregate material payoff requires that the
endowment is allocated to the public good.7 With the dominant strategy
equilibrium of zero contribution to the public good, all equilibrium
deviations benefit others and are consistent with generosity. Conse-
quently, quick erroneous deviations from equilibrium will attribute to
contributions being greater for fast decision-makers.
To explore the potential role of mistakes, we modify the VCM to a
public-good game where mistakes can be identified. We design a game
with an interior equilibrium where some deviations from equilibrium de-
crease both the earnings of the individual and the earnings of other group
members.8 As neither a selfish nor a generous person should be selecting
such contributions, we classify them as mistakes and examine whether the
rate of mistakes varies with response time. To demonstrate the effect
mistakes may have on inference from response time, we look at the effect
of varying the location of the equilibrium. The equilibrium in one set of
treatments lies below the midpoint of the strategy set (as in the VCM) and
in another lies above the midpoint. This variation allows us to explore if the
finding that fast decision-makers contribute more than slow decision-ma-
kers is robust to changing the location of the equilibrium, and thereby
assess whether mistakes may have contributed to the earlier finding.
Our main study uses a 2×3 between-subject design. We examine
two different locations of the equilibrium, and three different time
treatments. In one of the time treatments, decision-makers freely
choose their response time. Time is instead exogenously manipulated in
the two other time treatments by imposing a time delay or a time limit.
The two different locations of the equilibrium allow us to assess the
relative generosity of fast versus slow decisions, and the role of mistakes
when drawing inference from response time. We refer to the treatment
with the equilibrium below the midpoint of the strategy set as the “Low”
treatment, and to the treatment with the equilibrium above the midpoint
of the strategy set as the “High” treatment. If response time solely re-
flects preferences, then we should find the same generosity ordering of
fast and slow decision-makers in the Low and High treatments. In par-
ticular, if fast decisions are more generous, then fast decision-makers
should make larger contributions in both the Low and the High treat-
ments. In varying the location of the equilibrium we can also assess the
responsiveness to incentives and whether it varies with response time.
Our three time treatments help us assess differences in behavior by
fast and slow decision-makers. We examine the effect of response time
when decision-makers are free to choose how long they take to decide
and when they are forced to make a fast or slow decision. In the en-
dogenous-time treatments we classify fast decision-makers as those who
use less than the median time to decide. In two exogenous-time treat-
ments we impose either time pressure or time delay. Decisions in time-
pressure treatments must be made before the time limit expires and
decisions in time-delay treatments cannot be made until after a time
limit has passed. In line with the endogenous-time treatments, we refer
to participants in the time-pressure treatment as fast decision-makers
and to those in the time-delay treatment as slow decision-makers.
Our results from the Low endogenous-time treatment replicate ex-
isting research on intuitive generosity, showing that fast decision-ma-
kers contribute more than slow decision-makers. However, this re-
lationship is reversed in the High endogenous-time treatment, where
fast decision-makers contribute less than slow decision-makers. We find
in both the Low and High endogenous-time treatments that fast deci-
sion-makers are more likely to make mistakes. That is, they choose
contributions that simultaneously decrease earnings to themselves and
to other group members. By contrast, slow decision-makers are more
likely to contribute the equilibrium amount, and when they deviate
from the dominant strategy they are more likely to make welfare-im-
proving contributions. Comparing the Low and High treatments we find
significant differences in the contributions made by slow decision-ma-
kers, while those made by fast decision-makers are not distinguishable
by treatment. These results are replicated in the treatments with exo-
genous time-pressure and time-delay. Thus, fast decision-makers appear
insensitive to incentives and are more prone to error, irrespective of
whether they voluntarily make fast decisions or are forced to do so.
All these findings are from one-shot interactions. We also have data
from repeated interactions, which shows that contributions quickly
converge toward the interior equilibrium. Convergence of average
contributions occurs from above in the Low treatments and from below
in the High treatments. These opposing directions of convergence are
consistent with overcontribution in the Low treatment and the under-
contribution in the High treatment being due to mistakes.
As noted above, our main study examines contributions in a public-
good game with an interior equilibrium. Specifically, we rely on pie-
cewise linear payoff functions that allow us to identify mistakes. The
resulting payoff structure is less transparent than that of the classic
VCM games, and this complexity may increase the rate of mistakes
4 Central to models of dual selves is that decisions are influenced by an intuitive system
which is responsible for automated, rule-based choices, and by a deliberative system,
through which calculated reflective decisions are made (see e.g., Evans, 2008; Kahneman,
2003, 2011; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988; Loewenstein and O'Donoghue, 2004; Benhabib and
Bisin, 2005; Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, 2012). Examples
of studies asking whether generosity is intuitive or calculated are Martinsson, Myrseth,
and Wollbrant (2012), Kocher et al. (2017), Kinnunen and Windmann (2013), Kessler and
Meier (2014), Achtziger et al. (2015), Yamagishi et al. (2017). Dreber et al. (2016) ex-
tends the dual-self model to account for intuitive generosity. While it is important to
understand whether generosity is intuitive, it is less clear how one is to examine it. For
example, Vesterlund (2016) argues that a temptation to give generates the same com-
parative statics as those attributed to “avoiding the ask” in DellaVigna et al. (2012). Some
studies suggest that generosity is intuitive while others find evidence in favor of a de-
liberate generosity hypothesis. For example, Ruff et al. (2013), and Kinnunen and
Windmann (2013) show evidence consistent with other-regarding behavior being in-
tuitive, while Achtziger et al. (2015, 2016), Knoch et al. (2006), Kocher et al. (2017),
Fiedler et al. (2013) and Strang et al. (2014) show evidence consistent with other-re-
garding behavior being a deliberative choice.
5 See Rand et al. (2012), Lotito et al. (2013) and Nielsen et al. (2014) for studies ex-
amining the correlation between contributions and response times. Tinghög et al. (2013),
Rand et al. (2014), and Bouwmeester et al. (2017) examine the response to time pressure.
6 Studies examining the correlation between response times and choices in beauty
contest games show that lower frequencies of dominated choices are associated with
larger response times (e.g., Kocher and Sutter, 2006; Rubinstein, 2007; and Agranov
et al., 2015).
7 Throughout the paper we use the term ‘dominant strategy’ to refer to selfish material
payoff-maximizing choices, and Nash equilibrium refers to the Nash equilibrium under
narrow material selfishness.
8 We maintain an equilibrium in dominant strategies and place both the equilibrium
and the group-payoff-maximizing outcomes away from the boundaries and the midpoint
of the strategy set. These non-linear public-good games allow us to identify mistakes and
to better capture the incentives associated with voluntary contributions to public goods.
Examining voluntary contributions to public goods, be it in theoretical or empirical work,
researchers assume that there exists an interior equilibrium where individuals have a
private incentive to secure the good (street lighting, clean air, etc.) and where the mar-
ginal return from such goods are decreasing (e.g., Bergstrom et al., 1986).
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(although such an increase should not affect whether mistakes are more
likely to be made by fast or slow decision-makers). We therefore con-
duct an additional set of experiments where we ask whether similar
results arise when the return to giving is constant as in the VCM, but the
strategy set includes contributions that are dominated from an in-
dividual and group perspective. By adding a private benefit for con-
tributing to the public good, we examine how contributions change
when we move the dominant strategy from one of zero contribution to
one of full contribution. In the latter case, any contribution below full
contribution reduces the earnings of the individual and of all other
group members. This High-VCM treatment replicates our results. In
contrast to previous (Low-) VCM results, we find that fast decision-
makers contribute less than slow decision-makers. As with our interior-
equilibrium designs, we also examine how sensitive decisions are to the
location of the equilibrium by comparing contributions in the Low-VCM
and High-VCM treatments. Consistent with our results in the interior
equilibrium experiments, fast choices appear to be insensitive to
treatment changes while slow choices vary significantly by treatment.
Examining choices of 476 participants in different variations of our
Low and High treatments, we find that choices by slow decision-makers
respond to incentives and are sensitive to the location of the equilibrium,
while choices made by fast decision-makers are indistinguishable by the
respective Low and High treatments. This insensitivity to treatment is
particularly intriguing considering the range of dominated actions is much
greater in the High than Low treatments. The lack of response to treatment
by fast decision-makers indicates that fast choices are unlikely to reflect
(solely) preferences over payoffs. Thus, for fast decisions one must be
careful in interpreting deviations from equilibrium as evidence of (non-)
standard preferences. As in the work on rational inattention and costly
information processing by Caplin and Dean (2015) it may be that domi-
nated choices (by fast decision-makers) result from an unwillingness to
trade cognitive effort for monetary reward in our endogenous-time treat-
ments, and an inability to do so in our exogenous-time treatments.
In addition to examining the ability to directly infer preferences from
response time, our study makes three broader methodological contribu-
tions. First, in identifying mistakes we demonstrate that a number of
participants fail to internalize the incentives presented to them in the
experiment. This resonates with the “failure of game-form recognition”
documented by Cason and Plott (2014). Failure to internalize incentives
must be considered not only when examining response time, but in any
study where confusion or lack of attention and motivation leads to mis-
takes that may influence inference. Second, and intriguingly, it appears
that response time is one way in which we may be able to evaluate the
effect of mistakes. Third, our study serves as a demonstration of what is
needed for causal inference. Studies of high internal validity eliminate
confounding factors, thus securing that inference comes not only from
confirmation of a predicted comparative static, but also from elimination
of alternatives that generate the same comparative static.
2. Related literature
The economics literature is increasingly relying on measures of re-
sponse time to study decision-making. Early work by Wilcox (1993)
viewed response time as a proxy for decision cost and analyzed choices
in risky environments. The subsequent literature has used response time
to investigate the decision process employed by individuals, to make
inferences about preferences, and to predict choices within and across
domains (see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2017 for a review).9
Rubinstein (2007) put forward the idea that fast choices are in-
stinctive while slow choices are cognitive and analyzed the correlation
between response times and choices in seven different strategic en-
vironments (see also Kahneman, 2011). Together with Rubinstein (2013,
2016) the work documents large variation in the types of choices asso-
ciated with fast response times.10 Rubinstein (2016) develops a typology
of players that uses response times and the choices associated with slow
response times to study and predict decision-making across games.
The literature has used two different response-time methods to identify
intuitive and deliberate actions in public-good games. One method ex-
amines how an individual's self-chosen response time correlates with
contributions. Using this method, Rand et al. (2012) find a negative cor-
relation between contributions and response time in the standard VCM,
and see this as consistent with generosity on average being an intuitive
response and greed on average being a calculated response. Lotito et al.
(2013) replicate this results when endowments are asymmetric, and
Nielsen et al. (2014) do so when instead a strategy method is employed.11
A potential concern in examining endogenously arising response time,
however, is that the inference may result from selection into fast and slow
decision-making based on the strength of preferences (reverse inference).
In particular, very generous participants may respond quickly not because
they are intuitively generous but rather because the decision is an easier
one for them to make (Krajbich et al., 2015). As very selfish participants
also may find the decision easier, the argument is that the negative cor-
relation between response times and contributions may result if the share
of these very generous participants exceeds that of the very selfish parti-
cipants. To control for this, a second response-time method manipulates
response time by giving participants a time limit to either induce time
pressure or time delay. In examining the effect of time pressure, Rand et al.
(2012, 2014) find that individuals who have to make quick decisions are
more generous than those who have to take time to decide. Tinghög et al.
(2013) and Bouwmeester et al. (2017) largely fail to replicate this result
and note a potentially different selection problem that may result when
participants fail to obey the time limit.
The literature on public-good contributions, or generosity more
broadly defined, and response time has to date given limited attention
to the role of error. Specifically, it has not examined choices in en-
vironments that can identify both generosity and mistakes. As noted
above, mistakes are of particular concern in the VCM where all devia-
tions from the equilibrium are welfare improving and thus can be ra-
tionalized by generosity.12 If errors are independent of response times
9 We limit our review to research related to intuitive actions, generosity, and error.
Research on response times and decision-making in other environments include Chabris
et al. (2009); Milosavljevic et al. (2010); Krajbich et al. (2010); Krajbich and Rangel
(2011); Krajbich et al. (2012); Clithero and Rangel (2013); Krajbich et al. (2014); and
Schotter and Trevino (2012). Examples of exogenous manipulations of response time is
seen in Ibanez et al. (2009), Cappelletti et al. (2011); Nursimulu and Bossaerts (2014);
Kocher et al. (2013), and Reutskaja et al. (2011).
10 In Rubinstein (2007, 2016) fast decisions are associated with fair outcomes in some
settings, with equilibrium and efficiency maximizing choices in others, and with the use
of strictly dominated choices in yet other environments. In many of the strategic settings
investigated, focal choices coincide with fair, equilibrium, efficiency maximizing, and
strictly dominated strategies.
11 Branas-Garza et al. (2016) document a negative correlation between offers to re-
sponders and proposers' response times in the ultimatum game. Rubinstein (2007, 2016)
shows only a negative correlation when offers above the 50–50 threshold are excluded.
Analysis of non-strategic environments such as the dictator game and actual donation
decisions shows mixed results. Piovesan and Wengström (2009) find a positive correlation
between offers in the dictator game and response time. Cappelen et al. (2016) show in-
stead that equal split offers are associated with faster response times than selfish choices
in the dictator game. Lohse et al. (2016) show that response times are positively corre-
lated with monetary contributions to CO2 emission. Kessler et al. (2017) examine dictator
and prisoners' dilemma games varying the return to altruistic actions following the pro-
cedure of Caplin et al. (2011) and Agranov et al. (2015) to incentivize participants to
make a choice during every second of deliberation, and find that fast decisions are not
always associated with selfishness or generosity but rather that efficiency concerns
matter.
12 Similarly, deviations from the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium in the standard
dictator game and in the ultimatum game can also be seen as generous behavior (for
alternative views see Cherry et al., 2002, Bekkers, 2007, and Dana et al., 2007). While it is
tempting to argue that offers in excess of 50% of the endowment are mistakes in these
settings, response time data indicates that such generous choices are sometimes asso-
ciated with slow response times and thus seen as indicative of deliberation (see e.g.,
Rubinstein, 2007, 2016; and Piovesan and Wengström, 2009). Furthermore, in such
settings the midpoint of the strategy set is focal and coincides with the fair outcome,
making it impossible to distinguish between focal, generous or fair choices, and mistakes.
M.P. Recalde et al. Journal of Public Economics 160 (2018) 132–147
134
this is, of course, not an issue for inference on preferences. However, it
becomes an important confound if errors are systematically related to
the time individuals take (or are forced to take) to decide. If it holds
that fast (or slow) decision-makers more frequently make mistakes,
then response time will be a poor measure of preferences.13
The aim of our study is to demonstrate that mistakes can be sys-
tematically related to response time and that failure to account for
mistakes may cause the inference of intuitive responses to reverse
across strategic environments. Our study contributes to the literature by
asking whether response time is a reliable indicator of individual pre-
ferences in public-good games. Specifically, we examine contributions
in a strategic setting where we can distinguish quick mistakes from
intuitively generous behavior and examine whether error affects the
comparative static on the relative generosity by fast and slow decision-
makers.14 While our study focuses on public-good games, our results
are also informative on inference from response time in other settings.
Mistakes are likely to play a prominent role in many strategic en-
vironments, hence inference on preferences from such settings require
that mistakes and their distribution over time are accounted for.
3. Identifying mistakes
In the standard VCM it is not possible to determine whether in-
dividuals, in making a positive contribution, are making a mistake or
aiming to increase the earnings of others. Impeding the identification of
mistakes is that any deviation from the dominant strategy of zero
contribution increases group payoffs. We design a set of public-good
games where mistakes can be identified. This allows us to examine
whether preferences can be inferred from response time. More specifi-
cally, we examine two different types of public-good games. One with
an interior equilibrium and one where the equilibrium is at the
boundary.
The first type uses piecewise linear payoffs to secure a unique in-
terior Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies and an interior group-
payoff-maximizing contribution. This type of public-good game secures
that there are deviations from equilibrium that decrease both the
earnings of the individual and the earnings of other group members.
Such decisions are unambiguously dominated for individuals aiming to
increase the earnings to self and/or others, and can thus be classified as
mistakes.15 The existence of these dominated decisions allows us to
examine how the rate of mistakes varies with response time. We ex-
amine two different treatments. In one treatment (Low) the interior
equilibrium lies below the midpoint of the strategy set (as in the VCM),
and in the other treatment (High) it lies above the midpoint. Thus, the
range of contributions that constitute mistakes is larger in the High
treatment than in the Low treatment. Comparing the two treatments we
can thus assess the sensitivity to incentives and whether it varies with
response time. Moreover, we can determine the robustness of the earlier
finding that fast decision-makers contribute more than slow decision-
makers. If fast decisions are more prone to error, then we may find a
reversal of the earlier finding when moving from an equilibrium below
the midpoint of the strategy set to an equilibrium above it. Such a re-
versal would be inconsistent with greater fast contributions solely re-
flecting preferences.
The second type of public-good games uses linear payoffs (as in the
VCM) maintaining that full contribution maximizes group-payoffs and
placing the dominant strategy equilibrium at the boundary of the
strategy set. The dominant-strategy equilibrium in one treatment (Low-
VCM) is at zero contribution, while an added private contribution
benefit places the equilibrium at full contribution in the second treat-
ment (High-VCM). Even though mistakes cannot be identified in the
Low-VCM, they can be identified in the High-VCM, where full con-
tribution is dominant both from an other-regarding perspective and
from a selfish individual payoff-maximizing perspective. As in the in-
terior equilibrium treatments, we can also identify how fast and slow
decision-makers respond to changes in incentives by comparing their
contribution decisions in the Low-VCM and the High-VCM treatments.
In what follows, we first describe the design and results of our first
set of public-good treatments. We report on the interior public-good
game treatments along with several robustness checks (Section 4). We
then proceed to report on the Low- and High-VCM treatments where the
equilibria are at the boundary of the strategy set (Section 5).
4. Public-good games with interior equilibria
We first describe the payoff structure of the interior public-good
games followed by the procedures and results of the experiment.
4.1. Payoffs
To secure an interior equilibrium we use a piecewise linear payoff
structure similar to that of Bracha et al. (2011).16 Participants are
matched in groups of four and each is given a $10 endowment and
asked how much they wish to contribute (in $1 increments) to a group
account. Contributions to the group account generate a constant and
equal benefit to the other group members (as in the VCM). An interior
dominant strategy equilibrium is secured by modifying the individual's
private benefit of contributing such that it is approximately concave
(using a piecewise linear approximation).
We construct piecewise linear payoffs with the following five
characteristics. First, there is an interior Nash equilibrium in dominant
strategies, which varies by treatment. In the Low treatment, the equi-
librium contribution is $3 and in the High treatment the equilibrium
contribution is $7. Second, there is a unique interior group-payoff-
maximizing contribution of $9, which is the same in both treatments.
Third, equilibrium payoffs as well as the boundary payoffs associated
with contributing $0 and $10 are held constant across treatments.
Fourth, payoffs are chosen such that individually costly but group-
payoff-improving contributions range from $4 to $9 in the Low treat-
ment, and from $8 to $9 in the High treatment, while the individual's
cost of deviating from the equilibrium contribution toward the middle
of the strategy set (between $3 and $7) is held constant in the two
treatments. Fifth, there are deviations from equilibrium that can be
classified as mistakes because they simultaneously decrease the payoffs
of the decision-maker and of all other group members. These con-
tributions range from 0 to 2 in the Low treatment and from 0 to 6 in the
13 Evidence on how mistakes vary with response time is mixed. Rubinstein (2013) finds
in 10 decision tasks that mistakes decrease with time when facing questions that have a
definitive right answer, mistakes defined as violations of transitivity instead increase with
time, and mistakes defined as violations of consistency do not change with time. Time
pressure has been shown to increase the rates of rejection in the first round of a repeated
ultimatum game (Sutter et al., 2003) and to increase guesses in the beauty contest game
(Kocher and Sutter, 2006). Rubinstein (2007) shows that choices at or above the midpoint
of the strategy set in the 2/3 beauty contest game are associated with faster response
times. Agranov et al. (2015) use a strategy-type method that maps choices over response
time in the beauty contest game and show that while the guesses of strategic players
decrease with response time, non-strategic players make average guesses that coincide
with the midpoint of the strategy set and do not change with time. Gill and Prowse (2017)
show in a between-subject analysis of repeated decisions in the beauty contest game that
higher response times are associated with lower guesses, higher success rates, and higher
earnings.
14 A potential reversal of the comparative static on relative generosity between the
High and Low treatments addresses the concern of reverse inference driving the com-
parative static in treatments where participants endogenously select their response time.
If particularly generous (or particularly selfish) individuals make faster decisions than
those with less intense preferences, then we would expect a similar comparative static in
the High and Low treatments.
15 Our objective is to identify potential mistakes and not the mechanism behind them,
which could be inattention, confusion, lack of motivation and more. The identification of
these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper and we leave it for future research.
16 This piecewise linear payoff structure has also been used by others. E.g., Menietti
et al. (2012), Menietti (2012), Cason and Gangadharan (2015), and Robbett (2016).
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High treatment. Table 1 summarizes the features of the design. The
precise payoff function and payoff tables are shown in the Appendix A.
Our design allows us to assess whether fast- or slow-deciding par-
ticipants make more mistakes and whether fast decision-makers con-
tribute more, independent of treatment. If mistakes are more frequently
made by fast decision-makers, we may find that fast decision-makers
contribute more than slow decision-makers in the Low treatment and
find the reverse relationship in the High treatment. The sensitivity to
treatment is intriguing as the range of contributions that classify as
mistakes is far greater in the High than in the Low treatment.
4.2. Experimental procedures
Here we describe the procedures of the endogenous-time treat-
ments. That is, the treatments where each participant could make a
choice at his or her own pace. Procedures of the time-pressure and time-
delay treatments, where participants were respectively forced to make
decisions within some time limit or had to wait for some time before
being allowed to submit a decision, are similar. Differences are ex-
plained when introducing these treatments in Section 4.4.2 and in the
online Appendix.
The experiment was conducted at the Pittsburgh Experimental
Economics Laboratory (PEEL) at the University of Pittsburgh. Using a
between-subject design we conducted four sessions of each of the two
treatments. With 20 participants per session a total of 160 under-
graduate students participated in these treatments. Each session lasted
approximately 45min with average payments being $22.50 per subject
(including a $6 show up fee).
Upon entering the lab, participants were seated in a pre-marked
cubicle, and were asked to provide informed consent to participate in
the study. We then distributed instructions and read them out loud.
Participants were informed that they would be matched in groups of
four and that they would each be given an endowment of $10, which
they could invest in $1 increments in a group account. Participants
knew that investment decisions would affect their payoffs and the
payoffs of other group members, but were given no details on the actual
payoff structure. They were told that this information would be pre-
sented via payoff tables displayed on the computer screen. The in-
structions explained how they should read the payoff table and in-
formed them that they would have to complete a tutorial before
proceeding.17
Interfaces for the tutorial and for the decision-making part of the
experiment were programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The
tutorial used an abstract payoff table in which participants had two
investment options. The payoffs in each cell were denoted using matrix
notation. That is, no monetary payoffs were presented but rather
combinations of letters and numbers (e.g., $A11). This procedure al-
lowed participants to learn how to read the payoff table without the
possibility of deliberating about selfish and/or generous choices.
Thereafter, participants had to answer six tutorial questions, which
asked them to identify the abstract payoffs associated with different
investment choices made by all group members. The tutorial allowed
participants to enter incorrect answers, but presented solutions to
ensure comprehension.
The decision-making phase began after the tutorial. Individual
computer screens displayed the payoff table and asked participants to
make a contribution decision. For a given contribution made by the
other three group members, the payoff table listed, for each possible
contribution decision between $0 and $10, the individual's payoff and
the average payoffs of the other group members. Time was recorded as
the number of seconds it took participants to make a decision after
seeing the payoff table. Time was not displayed on the decision screen.
Once all contributions were made participants were shown a payoff
screen informing them of their own contribution, the total and average
contribution of other group members, their own payoff and the average
payoff of the other group members.
This ended Part 1 of the experiment and participants received in-
structions for Part 2. No details on Part 2 were given prior to this stage.
Part 2 consisted of 10 periods of the same decision scenario as Part 1.
Participants were informed that in each period they would be randomly
re-matched with other group members, and that they could not be re-
matched with the same group members twice in a row. Participants
were at the beginning of the session informed that the experiment
would consist of two parts and that only one of the two parts would
count for payment. If Part 2 was selected for payment, only one ran-
domly selected period would be paid. At the end of each period parti-
cipants received the same feedback as in Part 1. After completing the
decision phase participants received a demographic questionnaire to
determine age, gender, nationality, year in college, and college major.
4.3. Results
In this section we use Part 1 decisions to assess the relationship
between endogenously chosen response times and contributions. We
start with a description of contributions, then report on the correlation
between contributions and response time, and finally examine how
choices by fast and slow decision-makers differ. In Section 4.4 we ex-
amine the robustness of our results by reporting on three different sets
of data, including the Part-2 data and data from the treatments with
time pressure and time delay.
4.3.1. Contributions
Our first result is that generally participants respond to the different
incentives in the Low and High treatment. Fig. 1 presents a histogram of
contributions by treatment. It shows that the modal contribution in the
Low and High treatment is the equilibrium prediction ($3 and $7, re-
spectively); 35% of participants in the Low treatment contribute $3 and
36% of participants in the High treatment contribute $7.18
In the Low treatment the average contribution exceeds the equili-
brium prediction of $3 (mean=$5.06, p<0.01), whereas in the High
treatment it falls short of the equilibrium prediction of $7
(mean= $6.57, p<0.10).19 Hence, relative to the equilibrium pre-
diction, participants overcontribute in the Low treatment and under-
contribute in the High treatment, and contributions in the Low treat-
ment are below those in the High treatment (p<0.01).20
In both the Low and High treatments we see deviations from equi-
librium that decrease both individual and group payoffs. These payoff-
reducing contributions include contributions below the equilibrium and
above the group-payoff-maximizing contribution of $9. While con-
tributions below the dominant strategy can clearly be interpreted as
Table 1
Design features.
Treatment Low High
Endowment 10 10
Dominant strategy 3 7
Group-payoff-maximizing contribution 9 9
Mistakes 0–2 0–6
17 The payoff tables used in the experiment are presented in the paper Appendix. For
the instructions see the online Appendix.
18 This frequency of equilibrium play is higher than that usually documented for
VCMs. Isaac et al. (1984) document a 30% frequency of equilibrium play (across 10
rounds) in VCMs with varying group sizes and marginal per capita returns (19% in the
first round of play when group size is four). See Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) for
a review of frequency of equilibrium play in VCM studies.
19 Unless otherwise noted all tests are two-sided t-tests.
20 The differences in the distribution of contributions across treatments are statistically
significant (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p<0.01).
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mistakes, because they simultaneously decrease the contributions of the
decision-maker and of all other group members, contributions in excess
of $9 could be either mistakes or a sign of extreme generosity. The
individual costs associated with giving $10 rather than $9 are so large
that they exceed the increase in total earnings of other group members
and thus decrease overall group payoffs. However, such contributions
cannot be identified as mistakes as they may result from a very high
level of generosity. In Section 4.4 we report on additional experiments
with a slightly modified payoff structure where contributions of $10
decrease earnings for both self and others, allowing us to classify $10
contributions as mistakes.
Interestingly, when disregarding equilibrium play, the distributions
of contributions in Fig. 1 appear insensitive to treatment. Absent con-
tributions of $3 and $7 we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
two samples come from the same underlying distribution (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov p=0.780), nor can we reject that the average of the con-
tributions are the same (mean Low=$6.10, mean High=$6.47;
p=0.479). The similarity in contributions is particularly striking when
considering contributions of $4, $5, and $6. While these contributions
may be seen as generous in the Low treatment, they are dominated from
a group and individual perspective in the High treatment.21 The simi-
larity of these non-equilibrium contributions across treatments with
vastly different incentive structures, suggests that costly welfare-im-
proving contributions in the Low treatment are not reflective of gen-
erous contributions but rather of mistakes.
4.3.2. Response times and contributions
The time it takes to make a contribution decision varies sub-
stantially across participants. Some participants spend as little as 4 s
making a decision whereas others spend several minutes deciding.
However, response times do not differ by treatment.22
Using OLS regressions with contributions as the dependent variable
we explore the correlation between response times and contributions.23
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the results for participants in the Low
treatment. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on
response time reveals that fast decision-makers contribute more than
slow decision-makers when the equilibrium is below the midpoint of
the strategy set, thus confirming earlier VCM findings. The estimated
coefficients correspond to participants who delay their decision by
1min on average contributing $1.14 less than those who make a con-
tribution decision right away.
The correlation between contributions and response times is, how-
ever, sensitive to treatment. Column 2 of Table 2 shows that in the High
treatment the correlation is reversed. The positive and significant
coefficient reveals that fast decision-makers contribute less than slow
decision-makers. The coefficient on response time is of similar absolute
magnitude as the one estimated in the Low treatment. A participant
who delays the decision by 1min on average contributes $0.96 more
than someone who makes a contribution right away. Column 3 of
Table 2 pools the data from the two treatments to test whether treat-
ment effects are statistically different. Using a difference-in-difference
regression of contributions on response time and treatment, the re-
gression result shows two things. First, the insignificant coefficient of
the dummy variable High (1 if treatment is High, 0 otherwise) reveals
that when controlling for response time there is no difference in con-
tributions between treatments. Second, the positive and statistically
significant coefficient of the interaction between the dummy High and
response time (High× response time) shows that the correlation be-
tween contributions and response times differs between treatments.
While for fast decision-makers there is little difference in contributions
between the Low and High treatments, the difference increases with
response time, implying that the treatment differences seen in Fig. 1
result from slow decisions.24
The treatment insensitivity of fast decision-makers is summarized in
Fig. 2. Following the literature (e.g., Rand et al., 2012; Rubinstein,
2013, 2016), we use the median response time of the pooled sample
(41.5 s) to define fast and slow decision-makers.25 Fig. 2 shows that
while there are no significant treatment differences in the average
contributions by fast decision-makers (Mean Low=$5.54, Mean
Fig. 1. Histogram of contributions by treatment, Part 1
Note: The equilibrium contribution is 3 in the Low treatment and 7 in the High treatment.
The group-payoff-maximizing contribution is 9 in both treatments.
Table 2
OLS regression of contributions on response time.
Dep. Var.: contribution to group account Low
(1)
High
(2)
All
(3)
Response time −0.019⁎⁎ 0.016⁎⁎ −0.019⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
High −0.205
(0.598)
High x response time 0.035⁎⁎⁎
(0.010)
Constant 6.024⁎⁎⁎ 5.819⁎⁎⁎ 6.024⁎⁎⁎
(0.469) (0.376) (0.443)
N 80 80 160
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
⁎⁎ p<0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p<0.01.
21 The similarity in frequency of $10 contributions is noteworthy given the substantial
treatment differences in the cost of contributing $10.
22 Response time in seconds: Mean Low=50.6, Mean High= 46.78, p=0.497;
Median Low=41, Median High= 42.5; Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test
p=0.452; Kolmogorov-Smirnov p=0.560. Online Appendix Figure C1 shows the cu-
mulative distribution function of response time by treatment.
23 Online Appendix Table C1 presents Tobit regressions that account for censoring at
$0 and $10 and provide similar results.
24 In online Appendix Table C2 we show that the correlations between response times
and contributions documented in Table 2 are robust to controlling for age, gender, the
number of tutorial questions answered correctly, training in economics, and experience
with laboratory experiments. The results are also robust to excluding outlier observations.
Specifically, eliminating observations with response times in excess of 150 s does not alter
the coefficients on response time reported in Table 2 irrespective of including the full set
of controls in the regressions. See online Appendix Table C3.
25 Results are similar if an alternative definition of fast and slow decision-makers is
used which cuts the data at the fastest quartile of the distribution. The alternative defi-
nition shows insensitivity to payoffs among fast but not slow decision-makers and a po-
sitive correlation between response time and contributions in the High treatment. The
correlation between response time and contributions is negative but small and statisti-
cally insignificant in the Low treatment. Results are available from the authors upon
request.
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High=$6.08, p=0.380), there are substantial and statistically sig-
nificant differences in the average contributions by slow decision-ma-
kers (Mean Low=$4.56, Mean High=$7.05, p<0.01). Consistent
with Table 2 we find in the Low treatment that fast decision-makers
contribute more than slow decision-makers, but that the reverse holds
true in the High treatment (p=0.072 and 0.042 in each treatment
respectively). We also note that in both treatments standard deviations
are smaller for slow decision-makers.26
The results reported in Table 2 and Fig. 2 illustrate the difficulty
associated with drawing inference from response time. The location of
the equilibrium determines whether fast decision-makers contribute
more than slow decision-makers or vice versa. Looking at the dis-
tribution of contributions by response time it becomes clear why the
comparative static reverses with treatment. Fig. 3 presents a scatterplot
of response times and contributions by treatment. The solid vertical line
indicates the location of the equilibrium contribution ($3 and $7 in the
Low and High treatment, respectively) and the dashed vertical line
indicates the location of the contribution that maximizes the group's
total earnings ($9 in both treatments). The horizontal line indicates the
median response time of the pooled sample, separating fast decision-
makers below the horizontal line, from slow decision-makers above the
horizontal line. Inspecting the segments below the median response
time in the two panels of Fig. 3, we see that despite the vastly different
incentives fast contributions are similarly distributed in both treat-
ments. In contrast, slow contributions, depicted in the segments of
Fig. 3 above the median response time, show clear treatment differ-
ences.27
Table 3 summarizes the information contained in Fig. 3 and reports
the percentage of choices that are attributed to fast response times in
each treatment. Mistakes are defined as contributions that simulta-
neously decrease the payoff to the individual and to all other group
members. That is, contributions that fall below $3 in the Low treatment
and below $7 in the High treatment. The first row in Table 3 shows that
mistakes are overwhelmingly associated with fast response times in
both treatments. With 72% of mistakes being made in less than the
median response time we reject the null hypothesis that slow and fast
decision-makers are equally likely to make mistakes (2-sided Fisher's
exact test p<0.01 in the pooled sample).28 Moreover, contributions of
$10, which are dominated from a group-payoff-maximizing perspec-
tive, are also associated with fast responses (2-sided Fisher's exact test
p<0.01 in the pooled sample). By contrast, both equilibrium and
group-payoff-maximizing contributions are more likely to be made by
slow decision-makers (2-sided Fisher's exact test p<0.01 and
p=0.064, respectively, for equilibrium and group-payoff-maximizing
contributions in the pooled sample).29
Overall, our results show that the comparative statics of relative
generosity by fast versus slow decision-makers is sensitive to the loca-
tion of the equilibrium. While fast decision-makers do not generally
contribute more than slow decision-makers, they are more likely to
select a contribution that simultaneously lowers individual and group
payoffs, and their average contribution is unaffected by the treatment.
Fig. 2. Mean contribution by fast and slow decision-makers, Part 1
Note: Fast indicates that choices were made in less than the median response time, and
slow indicates that choices were made in the median response time or more.
Fig. 3. Scatterplot of contributions and response time by treatment, Part 1
Note: The solid vertical line indicates the Nash contribution, the dashed vertical line
indicates the group-payoff-maximizing contribution, and the solid horizontal line in-
dicates the median response time of the pooled sample (41.5 s).
Table 3
Contributions by treatment.
Low High All
# obs. % fast # obs. % fast # obs. % fast
Mistakes (below Nash) 4 75 29 72 33 73
Nash equilibrium 28 39 29 21 57 30
Above Nash & below
group-payoff-max.
38 53 10 50 48 52
Group-payoff-maximizing 4 25 4 0 8 13
Full provision (reducing
group payoff)
6 100 8 88 14 93
Midpoint of strategy set 13 46 12 67 25 56
All 80 51 80 49 160 50
Note: “fast” indicates that contribution decisions were made in less than the median re-
sponse time.
26 Tests for differences in the standard deviation of contributions reject the null hy-
pothesis that the variance of the contributions is the same for fast and slow decision-
makers (Brown - Forsythe robust test p<0.05 in both treatments).
27 For fast decision-makers, the distributions of contributions do not differ significantly
by treatment (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test yields p=0.232, and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov p=0.229), whereas those for slow decision-makers do (p<0.01 for both
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests).
28 Using response times rather than the fast versus slow partition to analyze whether
mistakes are associated with fast response times yields similar results. A probit regression
of mistakes on response time and treatment returns statistically significant marginal ef-
fects at means on response time in the pooled sample (coeff: −0.00494; s.e. = 0.001,
p<0.001). Results are also significant when analyzing the correlation between mistakes
and response time separately by treatment.
29 We report pooled data statistics because by treatment the number of observations in
some bins is very small. The 2-sided Fisher's exact test statistics for the Low and High
treatment separately are for mistakes (Low: p=0.616; High: p<0.01), equilibrium
contributions (Low: p=0.160; High: p<0.01), group-payoff-maximizing contributions
(Low: p=0.353; High: p=0.116) and contributions of $10 (p<0.05 in both treat-
ments).
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Rather than fast decision-makers being more generous, our results in-
dicate that fast decision-makers are more prone to making mistakes
than slow decision-makers.
4.4. Robustness checks: modified interior public-good games, time pressure
and time delay, dynamics of contributions
To further examine the role of mistakes we analyze three additional
sets of data. First, we conduct a set of additional experiments where we
slightly alter the payoff function to secure that contributing the whole
endowment decreases both the payoffs of the individual and of the
other group members, and thus can unambiguously be interpreted as a
mistake. Using this modified design, we ask whether the frequency of
full contributions responds to this change in incentives and whether we
replicate our initial results. Second, we examine whether our results
from the reported experiments with endogenously chosen response
times are robust to exogenously imposing time limits. That is, we ex-
amine behavior when decisions are made under time pressure or with
time delay. Finally, across the different types of treatments we examine
how contributions change and potentially converge in Part 2 of the
experiment.
4.4.1. Is contributing the whole endowment a mistake? Mod-low and mod-
high treatments
The analysis above revealed that contributions of $10 were pre-
dominantly made by fast decision-makers. Although such contributions
decrease individual as well as overall group earnings, they can be ra-
tionalized assuming extremely generous preferences.30 We therefore
conduct additional treatments where an increase in contributions from
$9 to $10 lowers earnings both for the individual and for every other
member of the group.31 Keeping the payoffs of all other combinations of
contributions the same as in the initial interior equilibrium experi-
ments, this ensures that both the lower and upper boundary of the
strategy set are dominated from the perspective of the individual and of
the other group members. We conduct four sessions of these treatments,
two with the Modified-Low treatment and two with the Modified-High
treatment. With 40 participants in each treatment, a total of 80 in-
dividuals participated in these modified treatments. The experimental
procedures were the same as in our initial Low and High design.
Results from the modified treatments show that the change in in-
centives, if anything, increases the frequency of $10 contributions.
Respectively 10 and 15% of participants contribute $10 in the
Modified-Low and Modified-High treatments.32 Similar to the initial
treatments, a large majority of the dominated $10 choices are made by
fast decision-makers, accounting for 80% of the $10 contributions (2-
sided Fisher exact test p=0.087).
We also find that the modification of payoffs does not alter the
above documented comparative statics. Fig. 4 shows the mean con-
tributions by response time in each of the two modified treatments. The
mean contributions by fast decision-makers continue to be indis-
tinguishable by treatment (mean Mod-Low=$6.22, mean Mod-
High=$6.00, p=0.802), while mean contributions by slow decision-
makers differ significantly by treatment (mean Mod-Low=$5.00,
mean Mod-High=$6.89, p=0.005). Thus, as in the initial treatments,
contributions by fast decision-makers are insensitive to incentives. The
rate of mistakes and equilibrium play also replicate our initial results.
Fast decision-makers account for 69.0% of the mistakes observed in the
two treatments (2-sided Fisher exact test p=0.019) and for 10.5% of
the observed equilibrium contributions (2-sided Fisher exact test
p<0.001).33
4.4.2. Exogenously imposed time limits: time-pressure and time-delay
To determine the extent to which our comparative statics may be
influenced by selection, we explore whether the results are robust to
using an exogenously set time limit to secure fast and slow decisions,
respectively. For this we conduct two additional sets of treatments. In
one set of time-pressure treatments, we force participants to make
choices within a given time limit. In another set of time-delay treat-
ments, we allow participants to finalize their decisions only once the
time limit has passed. We use the modified payoff structure (Mod-Low
and Mod-High) to ensure that $10 contributions are mistakes from the
perspective of the individual and of the other group members, and we
use the median response time from these endogenous-time modified
treatments to establish the time limit (35 s).
Instructions and tutorial procedures were the same as those used in
treatments without a time limit. However, after the tutorial and right
before the decision screen, participants were presented with an in-
formation screen that described the time-limit manipulation. In the
time-pressure treatment this screen specified that they would earn $0
and contribute $0 to the group account if they did not make a choice
within the time limit.34 The strong incentive to obey the time limit
aimed to incentivize compliance and secured that failure to do so is a
mistake from an individual and other-regarding perspective. By design,
subjects in the time-delay treatment could not disobey the time limit,
and the information screen solely informed participants that while
seeing the payoff table and decision screen they would not be able to
submit their decision until after the time limit had passed. In both
treatments the decision screen showed the payoff table, the timer, and
reminded them of the time limit. All other procedures were the same as
Fig. 4. Mean contribution by fast and slow decision-makers, Mod-Low and Mod-High,
Part 1
Note: Fast responses are those made is less than the median response time of the pooled
sample of participants (36.5 s). Slow responses are those made in more than the median
response time.
30 In the initial interior equilibria treatments, the marginal cost of contributing $10
rather than $9 is $3.25 in the Low treatment and $1.25 the High treatment. The marginal
benefit to others from contributing is $0.75, or $0.25 per group member. Contributions of
$10 rather than $9 thus decrease total group payoffs by $2.50 and $0.50 in the Low and
High treatments, respectively.
31 Information about the exact payoff function used to generate payoff tables in these
modified treatments is provided in the Appendix. The payoff tables are shown in the
online Appendix.
32 In the initial Low (High) treatment 8 (10) percent contribute $10.
33 Excluding an outlier, a probit regression of mistakes on response time and treatment
provides a marginal effect on response time of −0.0046 (s.e.= 0.002, p=0.028). The
outlier is associated with a 346 s response time. In comparison, the next longest decision
time in our Mod-Low and Mod-High treatments is 136 s. Including the outlier, the coef-
ficient on response time remains negative but is statistically insignificant (coeff:
−0.0008, s.e.= 0.001, p=0.464). See online Appendix D for a scatterplot of contribu-
tions and response time. Results mirroring those of Section 4.3 for all robustness treat-
ments are presented in the online Appendix.
34 Screenshots of the relevant information and decision screens are presented in online
Appendix E.
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in the treatments without a time limit, including Part 2 where there was
no time limit.35
Using a between-subject design, a total of 160 undergraduate stu-
dents participated in the time limit treatments. None of them had
participated in any other treatment. Using a 2×2 design, a total of 4
treatments were conducted: (1) Mod-Low with time pressure, (2) Mod-
Low with time delay, (3) Mod-High with time pressure, and (4) Mod-
High with time delay. We conducted two sessions of each treatment,
each with 20 participants.
Out of the 80 participants that made decisions in Part 1 of the time-
pressure treatments, 5 failed to decide within the time limit. One in the
Mod-Low treatment and 4 in the Mod-High treatment. Because these
choices were associated with $0 contributions by design, we include
them in the analysis. All results are robust to excluding them.
We replicate our previous results when classifying all participants in
the time-pressure treatments as fast decision-makers and all partici-
pants in the time-delay treatment as slow decision-makers. Fig. 5 shows
the mean contribution in each of the time-limit treatments. Mean
contributions by fast decision-makers do not respond to incentives
(mean Mod-Low=$5.85, mean Mod-High=$5.55, p=0.635),36
while mean contributions by slow decision-makers do (mean Mod-
Low=$5.43, mean Mod-High=$7.38, p=0.000).37 The frequency of
mistakes and equilibrium play by fast versus slow decision-makers also
mirror those observed in the previously presented experiments. Pooling
the time-pressure and time-delay data, we find that fast decision-ma-
kers account for 67.8% of the observed mistakes (i.e., contributions
below the equilibrium and contributions of $10) and for 35.3% of the
observed equilibrium contributions. Two-sided Fisher exact tests reject
the null hypothesis that mistakes and equilibrium choices are equally
distributed across the time-pressure and time-delay treatments
(p=0.001 for mistakes and p=0.081 for equilibrium choices, re-
spectively). Thus, time pressure increases the rate of mistakes relative
to the time-delay treatment.38
4.4.3. Results of part 2: dynamics of contributions
Choices made in Part 2 of our experiments further allow us to assess
the extent to which choices are reflective of preferences. Recall that
Part 2 is a ten-period version of Part 1 with random re-matching of
group members in each period and no time limit. We present the data
from all public-good games with interior equilibria examined so far in
this section because the same Part 1 comparative statics were secured
for all the games, and because the response time is endogenously
chosen in every session of Part 2. We thus have data for a total of 400
participants.
The left panel of Fig. 6 shows average contributions in all of our Low
and High treatments. The right panel pools the data from all treatments
with the same dominant strategy equilibrium (i.e., Low or High). Both
panels show that with repetition contributions decrease on average in
the Low treatments, while they increase on average in the High treat-
ments. That is, contributions converge to the equilibrium prediction
from above in the Low treatments and from below in the High treat-
ments. It is noteworthy that by round seven the median contribution
corresponds to the equilibrium in both the Low and the High treatments
(see right panel of Fig. 6).
The opposing directions of convergence in Part 2 are consistent with
the interpretation that overcontribution in the Low treatment and un-
dercontribution in the High treatment can be (partly) attributed to
mistakes. Looking at the frequency of equilibrium play and of mistakes
supports this interpretation. The share of equilibrium play increases
from 27.5% in Part 1 to 67.75% in the last period of Part 2 in the pooled
sample of Low and High treatments.39 Mistakes, on the other hand,
decrease from 30.25% in Part 1 to 8.5% in the last period of Part 2. The
decrease is sharper in the High treatment, where the set of actions that
can be classified as mistakes is larger and mistakes are more common.
The rate of mistakes decreases in the Low treatments from 11.5% in
Part 1 to 1% in the last period of Part 2, while it decreases in the High
treatments from 49% in Part 1 to 16% in the last period of Part 2.40
Using Part 1 response time (fast vs. slow) to examine contribution
behavior in Part 2 provides an additional way of assessing how con-
tributions change with deliberation and repetition. The contributions
by fast decision-makers converge with repetition in Part 2 to the con-
tributions made by slow decision-makers. Convergence again occurs
from the middle. Fast decision-makers initially contribute more than
slow decision-makers in the Low treatments, while they initially con-
tribute less than slow decision-makers in the High treatments. While
convergence from above in the Low treatments may be explained by
individuals becoming more selfish and/or by individuals correcting
mistakes when given more experience with a decision, convergence
from below in the High treatments instead can only be explained by
individuals becoming more generous and/or correcting mistakes. The
joint results thus lend support to the opposing directions of convergence
resulting from a correction of mistakes: fast subjects, who made error-
prone decisions in Part 1, learn not to play dominated strategies (see
online Appendix Fig. G1).
4.4.4. Summary
The results from the modified treatments, from the time-pressure
and time-delay treatments, and from the Part-2 behavior are consistent
with our initial interpretation of results from Part 1. Fast decision-
Fig. 5. Mean contribution by exogenous response time and treatment, Part 1.
35 The only additional difference was a $4 survey completion fee that was added as a
surprise after all contribution decisions were made in the time-pressure and time-delay
treatments. This $4 bonus ensured that the same recruiting message could be used as in
the treatments without a time limit.
36 Excluding the decisions that did not obey the time limit Mean Mod-Low=$6, Mean
Mod-High= $6.167, p=0.771.
37 See Appendix Table 1 for a comparison of the design features and results from the
different treatments.
38 As response time is exogenously manipulated it is less clear how we should examine
the relationship between the rate of mistakes and time. Pooling the time-pressure and
time-delay data and conducting a similar exercise to that presented in previous sections, a
probit regression of mistakes on (endogenous) response time and Mod-High treatment
provides a significant marginal effect on response time of −0.00843 (s.e. = 0.002,
p=0.001).
39 The share of equilibrium play increases from 24.5 to 61.5% in the Low treatments
and from 30.5 to 74% in the High treatments.
40 Contributions below the dominant strategy are mistakes in all treatments.
Contributions of $10 are mistakes in the Mod-Low and Mod-High treatments, but not
necessarily in the initial Low and High treatments. The marginal effect of probit regres-
sion of mistakes on period and treatment with standard errors clustered at the session
level provides a significant marginal effect on period of −0.011 (s.e. = 0.002,
p<0.001). By treatments the coefficient is−0.006 (s.e.= 0.001, p<0.001) for Low and
−0.018 (s.e.= 0.003, p<0.001) for High. Score bootstrapped tests that correct for the
small number of clusters provide similar results.
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makers appear to be less sensitive to individual and group incentives
and to be more prone to making mistakes. Depending on the strategic
environment, these characteristics make fast decision-makers appear
more generous in some circumstances and less generous in others. We
find in each of three types of treatments that mean contributions by fast
decision-makers exceed those by slow decision-makers in the Low
treatments, while the reverse holds in each of the High treatments. This
calls for caution when interpreting fast decisions as being reflective of
generosity or, more generally, preferences over payoffs. Rather, our
results indicate that the previously documented greater contributions
by fast decision-makers likely result from fast decision-makers being
more prone to making mistakes.
5. Public-good games with equilibria at the boundary (VCM)
To disentangle mistakes from generosity, we implemented public-
good games with an interior equilibrium. These games differ from that
of the standard VCM. The interior equilibrium public-good game may
be more confusing and potentially result in higher rates of error, and
our reliance on payoff tables may have triggered a cognitive mind state
without regard for others (e.g., Charness et al., 2004). While these
differences are unlikely to affect our comparative statics we, none-
theless, examine sensitivity to the location of the equilibrium in a less
complex set of environments.
In a set of VCM treatments, we keep the return to contributing
constant (as in the standard VCM), which implies that the dominant
strategy equilibrium is on the boundary of the strategy set. We examine
two such VCM environments where we modify the return to the in-
dividual from contributing: one where the dominant strategy equili-
brium, as in the standard VCM, is zero provision (Low-VCM) and one
where the dominant strategy equilibrium is full provision (High-VCM).
In these treatments, members of four-person groups can contribute none,
part, or all of an $8 endowment to a group account, where every con-
tributed dollar is doubled and split equally between group members.41
Hence, across treatments we keep constant the marginal benefit to others
from contributing. This marginal per capita return (MPCR) is $0.50, and
the equilibrium contribution is zero in the Low-VCM treatment. For the
High-VCM we secure an equilibrium with full provision by adding to the
$0.50 MPCR an individual contribution bonus of $0.60 per dollar con-
tributed. Only the individual contributing receives the contribution
bonus. As in the standard VCM, instructions are simple and payoffs are
characterized without the use of a payoff table and the associated tu-
torial. The rest of the procedures are as in our previous experiments.
We conducted four sessions of the VCM treatments, two sessions of
the Low-VCM treatment and two sessions of the High-VCM. In total 40
individuals participated in the Low-VCM and 36 participated in the
High-VCM treatment. Fig. 7 shows the distribution of contributions by
treatment. We first ignore the dominant strategies of $0 in the Low-
VCM and $8 in the High-VCM and examine non-equilibrium contribu-
tions in the range of $1 through $7. Contributions in this range are
welfare improving in the Low-VCM but are dominated from a group
perspective in the High-VCM. Despite these very different payoff con-
sequences, the contribution distributions are very similar (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov p=0.814). Equally striking is the similarities in the frequency
of $0 and $8 contributions. In what follows we look at how choices by
fast and slow decision-makers influence the similarities in contribution
distributions across treatments.
Using the median response time of 35.5 s in the pooled sample of
VCM treatments to distinguish between fast and slow decision-makers,
we find that the high frequency of non-equilibrium play is largely due
to fast decision-makers.42 Also mistakes, which can only be identified in
the High-VCM treatment, are associated with fast response times. With
70% of dominated choices in the High-VCM being made by fast deci-
sion-makers, we reject that mistakes are equally likely for fast and slow
decision-makers (2-sided Fisher's exact test p=0.019).43 Interestingly,
contributions of 0 in the High-VCM are primarily made by fast decision-
makers. Equilibrium and full provision choices, on the other hand, are
associated with slow response times in both treatments (2-sided Fisher's
exact test p=0.097 for the pooled sample for each of these two pro-
vision choices). Choices in the middle of the strategy set (i.e., providing
half of the endowment), which are welfare improving relative to the
dominant strategy in the Low-VCM but are dominated from an in-
dividual and other-regarding perspective in the High-VCM, are also
Fig. 6. Contribution by round and treatment
Note: Period 0 denotes Part 1.
41 To secure payoff ranges similar to the ones in our other experiments, we provide
each participant with an $8 endowment. This secures that maximum group payoffs across
treatments are comparable to those in the interior equilibrium treatments. See online
Appendix A and B for instructions and payoff information. Payoff descriptions were
provided to subjects on the same screen used to make contribution decisions. Response
time was measured from the moment the decision screen was shown.
42 There are no statistically significant differences in response time by treatment
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov p=0.279; Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test p=0.254). The
cumulative distribution functions of response time by VCM treatment are presented in
online Appendix Figure H1.
43 Excluding an outlier, a probit regression of mistakes on response time provides a
significant marginal effect on response time of −0.0111 (s.e.= 0.004, p=0.004). The
outlier is associated with a 277 s response time. The next slowest response time in these
treatments has a response time of 103 s. Including the outlier the marginal effect con-
tinues to be negative but statistically insignificant (coeff: −0.0011, s.e. = 0.002,
p=0.468).
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more frequently selected by fast decision-makers.44
Fig. 8 shows for fast and slow decision-makers the mean contribu-
tions by treatment. For the High-VCM we replicate the results from the
interior High treatments: fast decision-makers contribute less than slow
decision-makers ($2.86 vs. $6.07, p<0.01). In the Low-VCM we do
not, however, replicate the finding that fast decision-makers contribute
more than slow decision-makers ($3.41 vs. $4.09, p=0.457).45 While
inconsistent with the interpretation that fast decision-makers are more
generous, this result need not be inconsistent with fast decisions being
more prone to error. Indeed, the reason for looking at environments
with an interior equilibrium was precisely that in the Low-VCM all
equilibrium deviations are welfare improving, thus making it im-
possible to separate mistakes from generosity. Consistent with fast de-
cisions being more prone to error, fast decisions appear insensitive to
treatment while slow decisions vary significantly by treatment.46
The results from these simple VCM games mirror the results for our
interior public-good games. Fast decision-makers are less sensitive to
incentives and more prone to making mistakes.47
6. Conclusion
Response times are increasingly used to draw inference on individual
preferences. We argue that such inference can be misleading when mis-
takes are correlated with response time. To demonstrate this, we revisit the
finding that individuals who make (or have to make) fast decisions give
more in the standard VCM. While this finding has been seen as evidence
that individuals are intuitively generous, we argue that large fast con-
tributions may instead result from individuals making mistakes.
As mistakes cannot be identified with the standard VCM, we
examine contributions in public-good games with unique interior
equilibria in dominant strategies. In these games, we show that the
comparative statics of fast and slow decision-makers reverses with the
location of the equilibrium. Fast decision-makers tend to be more
generous than slow decision-makers when the equilibrium is located
below the midpoint of the strategy set, and less generous when the
equilibrium is located above the midpoint. Even though incentives
change with the location of the equilibrium, we find that mean con-
tributions for fast decision-makers do not vary.
In our study, we use public-good games where a subset of the
strategy set is dominated from an individual and other-regarding per-
spective. That is, where there are deviations from equilibrium that si-
multaneously decrease the earnings of the decision-maker and of all
other group members. Classifying these deviations as mistakes, we show
that the rate of mistakes decreases with response time. Even though the
set of actions that constitute mistakes increases as we move the equili-
brium from below to above the midpoint of the strategy set, fast deci-
sion-makers make choices that are indistinguishable across treatments.
These results hold both when response time is endogenously chosen and
when it is exogenously imposed by the experimenter.
The observed pattern of behavior suggests that fast responses rather
than being indicative of intuitive generosity instead result from fast
mistakes.48 Mistakes may result from fast decision-makers being con-
fused, not paying attention, or lacking motivation. In evaluating our
ability to draw inference on preference from response time, it is only
necessary to show that mistakes occur and that the rate of mistakes
varies with response time. Independent of the source, it is evident that
mistakes are an important confound.
Our finding that mistakes confound the inference on preferences
from response times suggests that caution is warranted when con-
sidering other experimental manipulations that also interact with mis-
takes. For example, giving participants an option to (continuously or
repeatedly) revise an initial decision to determine whether fast deci-
sions are impulsive will not only result in corrections for those who in
the heat of the moment contributed, but also for those who made a
mistake and wish to correct their decision. Just as response times are
correlated with error, experimental manipulations that influence error
will make inference on preferences difficult.49
The results of our paper extend beyond the study of response times
Fig. 7. Histogram of contributions by treatment, Part 1 VCM treatments
Note: The equilibrium contribution is 0 in the Low treatment and 8 in the High treatment.
The group-payoff-maximizing contribution is 8 in both treatments.
Fig. 8. Mean contribution by fast and slow decision-makers, Part 1 VCM treatments.
44 These results mirror Rubinstein (2016), who finds that full contribution is associated
with the largest response times in a 5 person Low-VCM, followed by zero and high
contribution choices of 60–90% of the endowment. Contributions equal to the midpoint
of the strategy set are associated with the smallest response times.
45 This result is consistent with Bouwmeester et al. (2017), who also fail to replicate
the comparative statics in the VCMs by Rand et al. (2012)
46 Mean contributions by treatment are not distinguishable for fast decision-makers
(Mean Low=$3.41, Mean High= $2.86, p=0.53), while they are distinguishable for
slow decision-makers (Mean Low=$4.09, Mean High= $6.07, p=0.03).
47 Part 2 reveals convergence to equilibrium in the Low-VCM treatment but not in the
High-VCM treatment. The frequency of equilibrium play increases in the Low-VCM from
20% in Part 1 to 70% in the last period of Part 2, while in the High-VCM it is at 25% in
Part 1 and in the last period of Part 2. Failure to converge in the High-VCM may result
from out-of-equilibrium relative earnings being lower for those who contribute the
equilibrium amount. For example a contribution profile of (g1,g2,g3,g4)= (8,0,0,0) se-
cures earnings of (8.8, 16.8, 16.8, 16.8). Thus, non-equilibrium play may be reinforced.
48 Error may play a smaller role in simple settings and a larger role in more complex
ones. This may explain why in the simple dictator game and in donation experiments a
positive correlation has been documented between kindness and response times (Piovesan
and Wengström, 2009; Fiedler et al., 2013; Lohse et al., 2016), while a negative corre-
lation has been found in the standard VCM (Rand et al., 2012; Lotito et al., 2013; Nielsen
et al., 2014) and in the ultimatum game (Branas-Garza et al., 2016).
49 For example, mistakes may increase as cognitive loads are increased and similarly
make it difficult to infer underlying preferences.
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and intuitive choices in public-good games and social dilemmas. They
indicate that independent of the environment caution is warranted
when trying to draw inferences about preferences from response times.
While we found fast decision-makers to be insensitive to the payoffs
associated with their choices, slow decision-makers were instead very
sensitive to changes in payoffs. Our results thus suggest that, compared
to fast decision-makers, the choices made by slow decision-makers
better reflect individual preferences over payoffs.
The concern for error raised here is likely to be greater when ex-
amining one-shot interactions. Response times may better reflect pre-
ferences in environments, such as those recently used to study drift
diffusion models, where individuals are presented with choices between
familiar products and asked to repeatedly make decisions in compar-
able environments. Our study also suggests that theoretical models of
decision-making may need to consider not only the possibility of dual
processes and response times but also how errors relate to response
times (see e.g., Caplin and Martin, 2016). Only with such models at
hand will empirical researchers be able to use response times for un-
biased inference on individual preferences.
In addition to examining whether preferences can be inferred from
response time, our paper makes three broader methodological con-
tributions. First, the finding that some participants seem insensitive to
incentives provides evidence of the role of error, and the broader need
to evaluate the effect that such behavior can have on inference.
Reminiscent of the “failure of game form recognition,” found by Cason
and Plott (2014) this payoff-insensitivity suggests that some partici-
pants engage in a decision environment that is very different from that
intended by the researcher. Second, our study points to response time as
a potential control for error. As a robustness check, it may be of interest
to evaluate separately decisions that occur with some minimal time
delay. While response time is a crude measure of mistakes, it is at least a
starting point for reducing the potential role of error. Finally, our re-
sults serve as a general caution for our response to novel comparative
statics. Identification requires not only an empirical confirmation of a
predicted comparative static, but also elimination of alternative ex-
planations of the relationship. Failure to eliminate error as an alter-
native explanation for the difference between fast and slow decisions
demonstrates the importance of eliminating confounds and securing
that our studies are internally valid.
Appendix A Payoffs
We follow Bracha et al. (2011) and use a piecewise linear payoff structure to construct public-good games with interior equilibria in dominant
strategies. Payoffs in the Low and High treatments are constructed using the following function:
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where πi denotes the monetary payoff individual i receives from his or her contribution gi to the group account and the sum of contributions G−i
made by the three other group members. σ is the constant return from the contribution by others, while the threshold gL, gHand gP along with the
parameters α, β, γ, and δ secure the piece-wise linear approximation of the concave private benefit from giving. Threshold contributions gL and gH
denote respectively the individual equilibrium contribution in the Low and High treatments, and gP denotes the individual contribution associated
with the unique group-payoff-maximizing outcome. Parameter σ remains constant across the Low and High treatments, while α, β, γ, and δ vary. That
is, across treatments we hold constant the benefit each group member gets from the contribution by others (σ), while the individual's private return
from contributing is varied.
Table A1
Payoff function parameters by treatment.
Parameter Low High
α 1.450 0.116
β -0.250 0.250
γ -0.500 -0.500
δ -3.250 -1.250
σ 0.250 0.250
gL 3.000 3.000
gH 7.000 7.000
gP 9.000 9.000
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Modified interior public-good games presented in Section 4.4 change some parameters of this payoff function to ensure that $10 contribution
choices are mistakes from an individual and other-regarding perspective. Specifically, δ is set to −2.25 and −0.25 in the Modified-Low and High
treatments, respectively, while σ=−0.15 in both treatments when gi>9.
Payoff functions were not presented to participants in any treatment. Treatments with interior equilibria only provided subjects with the payoff
tables. We provide the payoff tables used in the Low and High treatments in this Appendix. The payoff tables used in the other treatments with
interior equilibria are provided in the online Appendix, together with the instructions, and payoff descriptions used in the public-good games with
equilibria at the boundary.
Table A2
Payoff table Low treatment.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Y
o
u
r
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
0
10.00 10.75 11.50 12.25 13.00 13.75 14.50 15.25 16.00 16.75 17.50
10.00 11.95 13.90 15.85 16.10 16.35 16.60 16.85 16.85 16.85 14.10
1
11.45 12.20 12.95 13.70 14.45 15.20 15.95 16.70 17.45 18.20 18.95
10.25 12.20 14.15 16.10 16.35 16.60 16.85 17.10 17.10 17.10 14.35
2
12.90 13.65 14.40 15.15 15.90 16.65 17.40 18.15 18.90 19.65 20.40
10.50 12.45 14.40 16.35 16.60 16.85 17.10 17.35 17.35 17.35 14.60
3
14.35 15.10 15.85 16.60 17.35 18.10 18.85 19.60 20.35 21.10 21.85
10.75 12.70 14.65 16.60 16.85 17.10 17.35 17.60 17.60 17.60 14.85
4
14.10 14.85 15.60 16.35 17.10 17.85 18.60 19.35 20.10 20.85 21.60
11.00 12.95 14.90 16.85 17.10 17.35 17.60 17.85 17.85 17.85 15.10
5
13.85 14.60 15.35 16.10 16.85 17.60 18.35 19.10 19.85 20.60 21.35
11.25 13.20 15.15 17.10 17.35 17.60 17.85 18.10 18.10 18.10 15.35
6
13.60 14.35 15.10 15.85 16.60 17.35 18.10 18.85 19.60 20.35 21.10
11.50 13.45 15.40 17.35 17.60 17.85 18.10 18.35 18.35 18.35 15.60
7
13.35 14.10 14.85 15.60 16.35 17.10 17.85 18.60 19.35 20.10 20.85
11.75 13.70 15.65 17.60 17.85 18.10 18.35 18.60 18.60 18.60 15.85
8
12.85 13.60 14.35 15.10 15.85 16.60 17.35 18.10 18.85 19.60 20.35
12.00 13.95 15.90 17.85 18.10 18.35 18.60 18.85 18.85 18.85 16.10
9
12.35 13.10 13.85 14.60 15.35 16.10 16.85 17.60 18.35 19.10 19.85
12.25 14.20 16.15 18.10 18.35 18.60 18.85 19.10 19.10 19.10 16.35
10
9.10 9.85 10.60 11.35 12.10 12.85 13.60 14.35 15.10 15.85 16.60
12.50 14.45 16.40 18.35 18.60 18.85 19.10 19.35 19.35 19.35 16.60
Mistake Dominant strategy Group-payoff-maximizing contribution
Average investment made by the other group members
The BLUE
when they each invest the amount listed. 
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Table A3
Payoff table High treatment.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Y
o
u
r
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
0
10.00 10.75 11.50 12.25 13.00 13.75 14.50 15.25 16.00 16.75 17.50
10.00 10.62 11.23 11.85 12.60 13.35 14.10 14.85 14.85 14.85 14.10
1
10.12 10.87 11.62 12.37 13.12 13.87 14.62 15.37 16.12 16.87 17.62
10.25 10.87 11.48 12.10 12.85 13.60 14.35 15.10 15.10 15.10 14.35
2
10.23 10.98 11.73 12.48 13.23 13.98 14.73 15.48 16.23 16.98 17.73
10.50 11.12 11.73 12.35 13.10 13.85 14.60 15.35 15.35 15.35 14.60
3
10.35 11.10 11.85 12.60 13.35 14.10 14.85 15.60 16.35 17.10 17.85
10.75 11.37 11.98 12.60 13.35 14.10 14.85 15.60 15.60 15.60 14.85
4
10.60 11.35 12.10 12.85 13.60 14.35 15.10 15.85 16.60 17.35 18.10
11.00 11.62 12.23 12.85 13.60 14.35 15.10 15.85 15.85 15.85 15.10
5
10.85 11.60 12.35 13.10 13.85 14.60 15.35 16.10 16.85 17.60 18.35
11.25 11.87 12.48 13.10 13.85 14.60 15.35 16.10 16.10 16.10 15.35
6
11.10 11.85 12.60 13.35 14.10 14.85 15.60 16.35 17.10 17.85 18.60
11.50 12.12 12.73 13.35 14.10 14.85 15.60 16.35 16.35 16.35 15.60
7
11.35 12.10 12.85 13.60 14.35 15.10 15.85 16.60 17.35 18.10 18.85
11.75 12.37 12.98 13.60 14.35 15.10 15.85 16.60 16.60 16.60 15.85
8
10.85 11.60 12.35 13.10 13.85 14.60 15.35 16.10 16.85 17.60 18.35
12.00 12.62 13.23 13.85 14.60 15.35 16.10 16.85 16.85 16.85 16.10
9
10.35 11.10 11.85 12.60 13.35 14.10 14.85 15.60 16.35 17.10 17.85
12.25 12.87 13.48 14.10 14.85 15.60 16.35 17.10 17.10 17.10 16.35
10
9.10 9.85 10.60 11.35 12.10 12.85 13.60 14.35 15.10 15.85 16.60
12.50 13.12 13.73 14.35 15.10 15.85 16.60 17.35 17.35 17.35 16.60
Mistake Dominant strategy Group-payoff-maximizing contribution
Average investment made by the other group members
The BLUE . The 
when they each invest the amount listed. 
 
Table A4
Summary of design features and results: part 1, all treatments.
Public-good games with interior equilibria Public-good games with
Equilibria at the boundary
Original payoffs Modified payoffs Time limit
Low High Mod-low Mod-high Mod-low Mod-high Low-VCM High-VCM
Design features
Endowment 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8
Dominant strategy 3 7 3 7 3 7 0 8
Group-payoff-max. contribution 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8
Mistakes 0–2 0–6 0–2, 10 0–6, 10 0–2, 10 0–6, 10 n.a. 0–7
Fast decision-makers
Mean contribution 5.537 6.077 6.222 6.000 5.850 5.550 3.412 2.857
(std. error) (0.425) (0.440) (0.515) (0.671) (0.439) (0.450) (0.665) (0.562)
N obs. 41 39 18 22 40 40 17 21
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Slow decision-makers
Mean contribution 4.564 7.049 5.000 6.889 5.425 7.375 4.087 6.067
(std. error) (0.316) (0.188) (0.518) (0.290) (0.367) (0.281) (0.596) (0.628)
N obs. 39 41 22 18 40 40 23 15
All decision-makers
Mean contribution 5.063 6.575 5.550 6.400 5.637 6.463 3.800 4.194
(std. error) (0.271) (0.240) (0.375) (0.394) (0.285) (0.283) (0.442) (0.493)
N obs. 80 80 40 40 80 80 40 36
Two-sided t-test (p-values)
Fast vs. slow (within treatment) 0.072 0.042 0.106 0.267 0.460 0.001 0.457 0.001
Low vs. High: Fast decision-makers 0.380 0.801 0.635 0.525
Low vs. High: Slow decision-makers 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.034
Low vs. High: All decision-makers 0.000 0.122 0.042 0.552
Note: We employed a between-subject design and have data for a total of 476 participants across all treatments.
Appendix B Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.010.
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